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Dimensions of Constitutive Ambiguity
Abstract: Communication has the tendency to break down or to be misdirected. 
This happens especially in public communication , as the dramatic political con-
flicts at the beginning of the twenty-first century prove. If not caused by armed 
forces, these conflicts are usually produced by a concrete media event that trig-
gers competing interpretations and often leads to unforeseeable consequences. 
In our paper we claim that the origin of such conflicts lies in the phenomenon of 
constitutive ambiguity . Its thorough exploration opens up a fundamental under-
standing of communication. Though it is considered a key issue in the humani-
ties, we do not regard constitutive ambiguity as a mistake to be pragmatically 
rectified. In its inevitability, constitutive ambiguity rather unlocks a field of pos-
sibilities, the use of which is apt to even provide evolutionary advantages. In our 
paper we will give an overview, relating three types of ambiguity to a variety of 
notions used in linguistics , consider the medial forms of ambiguity , and differen-
tiate the semantic levels of ambiguity , particularly commenting on the pragmatic 
causes of constitutive ambiguity.
1   Introduction
Approximately 340 years ago, in 1668/69, Hans Jakob Christoffel von Grim-
melshausen’s Der abentheuerliche Simplicissimus Teutsch (The Adventurous Sim-
plicissimus) was published in five books. One of the main events in the first book 
is the arrest of the protagonist, Simplicissimus, in Hanau, who is then brought 
before an officer:
I knew not if it were he or she: for he wore his hair and beard French fashion, with long tails 
hanging down on each side like horse-tails, and his beard was so miserably handled and 
mutilated that between mouth and nose there were but a few hairs, and those had come 
off so ill that one could scarce see them. And not less did his wide breeches leave me in no 
small doubt of his sex, being such that they were as like a woman’s petticoats as a man’s 
breeches. So I thought, if this be a man he should have a proper beard, since the rogue is 
not so young as he pretends: but if a woman, why hath the old witch so much stubble round 
her mouth? […] So as I stood in doubt, knowing not of modern fashions, at last I held he was 
man and woman at once. (Grimmelshausen 1912, 64 )
This scene revolves around the ambiguity of the person’s attire (clothing, hair) 
as signs whose meaning is clearly dictated by fashion and, thus, negotiable. In 
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a rhetorical sense, the soliloquy represents the device of expressing doubt (dubi-
tatio): At first, Simplicissimus thinks the officer is a man, and then a woman. In 
order to finally solve the gender trouble, he chooses a third gender somewhere in 
between: a “mannish woman or this womanish man” (64). Simplicissimus con-
tinues to rely on this solution when conversing with the officer after his arrest: 
“Oh my good Hermaphrodite […] leave me my little prayer-book,” he begs the 
officer, who wants to take away his only belonging. But, as if having misheard 
or not understanding him correctly, the officer responds: “Thou fool […] who the 
devil told thee my name was Hermann?” (65). This passage of dialogue is based 
on two overlapping semantic scripts or frames: the anthropological frame and 
the frame of the proper name. On the intradiegetic level of communication , Sim-
plicissimus addresses the officer in jest, or in ignorance, as “(herm-)aphrodite” 
by using an anthropological classification as a proper name. It seems, however, 
as if the officer is also either especially ignorant or especially cunning. In his 
answer, he in turn conversely uses his proper name “Hermann” as an anthropo-
logical classification. As a result, he juxtaposes this anthropological type that 
connects something male (herm-) with something female (-aphrodite) to form 
‘hermaphrodite’ in opposition to a type that combines something male (herm-) 
with something male (-mann) to form something one could argue is especially 
male (Hermann). In using this successful strategy , the officer corrects the manner 
in which Simplicissimus addresses him, as if to say: What was once a hermaph-
rodite is now a Hermann. The agreement reached between the two characters is 
based on the fact that Simplicissimus and the officer accept the “wrong” use of 
the proper name as the “right” anthropological classification. Because the reader 
is cleverer than these two characters (or at least they think they are), and because 
they do not want to subscribe to this agreement of disambiguation , the joke works 
on the extradiegetic level of outer communication. Unlike the two characters, the 
reader allows the two semantic levels, or frames, to overlap: the anthropologi-
cal frame with the frame of the proper name. The resulting ambiguity suspends 
the disambiguation. The officer remains what he is: an ambiguous appearance 
whose gender identity cannot be determined without doubt.
This example leads to our central hypothesis that ambiguity is a characteris-
tic feature of communication and a phenomenon which, in principal, cannot be 
avoided. It can only be influenced or controlled up to a certain degree. Although 
ambiguity has often been the focus of research in various disciplines (primarily 
in rhetoric , linguistics , art history, and literary studies), fundamental research in 
cultural anthropology is still much needed. Occasionally, double and multiple 
meanings are clearly caused by misunderstandings that can be resolved by clari-
fying the different (contextual) premises, but these are only specific phenomena. 
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In principle , ambiguity is not a contingent but a constitutive dimension of com-
munication.
As a method of cultural symbolization, ambiguity is necessarily conveyed 
through specific media. Accordingly, the analysis of phenomena of ambiguity 
does not lead to a general cultural anthropology but to a specific media anthro-
pology. Ambiguity is hereby understood as a realm of possibility for each spe-
cific instance of communication conveyed through media. The analysis thereof 
does not aim to establish a catalogue of measures for avoiding ambig uities; the 
goal is rather to establish knowledge about the premises and mechanisms which 
are specific to different media and which make ambiguity a constitutive factor of 
communication and perhaps even (without giving away too much here) of evolu-
tion.
In order to better understand the phenomenon of constitutive ambiguity , we 
will begin with an overview of the different aspects of ambiguity by distinguish-
ing between its different types, forms, and levels. We will refer to these three ways 
of diversifying the phenomenon of ambiguity as the dimensions of ambiguity. 
Insofar as these dimensions provide meaningful distinctions, a three-dimen-
sional matrix can be designed, in which the variables entered would determine 
the different combinations of dimensions. The number of different phenomena of 
ambiguity can be, therefore, derived from the result of the possible combinations 
of categories. It is not our objective to accomplish the quite cumbersome task 
of actually creating this matrix in detail and filling it with examples, or to test 
whether each combination actually exists. Instead, we will illustrate how such a 
matrix could be built and organized.
In order to do that, we will, firstly, discuss the differences between the types of 
ambiguity according to Israel Scheffler , which we will, secondly, relate to several 
linguistic terms for phenomena of ambiguity . Thirdly, we will explain how we dif-
ferentiate between various forms of realizations of ambiguity in media, before we 
will, fourthly, differentiate the semantic levels of ambiguity . As our main aim is 
to better understand the typology of constitutive ambiguity in its media-specific 
forms, we will discuss especially how constitutive ambiguity is realized on a prag-
matic level with strategic communicative intentions. In the final section, this will 
serve as a basis for several evolutionary speculations. Overall, we are particularly 
interested in providing an overview of ambiguity in order to contribute to a better 
understanding of the connections between the different phenomena of ambigu-
ity.
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2   Types of Ambiguity (Israel Scheffler )
Over the past few years, the concept of ambiguity has been reappraised in several 
fields, especially in art history (Eco 1989 , Gamboni 2002 , Krieger & Mader 2010 , 
Haverkamp 2012 ), linguistics (Ernst 2003 ), literary studies (Berndt & Kammer 
2009 ), and rhetoric (Bauer et al. 2010 ). Nevertheless, for the most part, ambiguity 
as a term relates to specific problems of each discipline. Ambiguity in commu-
nication is, therefore, just as ubiquitous as it is hard to grasp. As early as 1936, 
Richards already anticipated “ambiguity to the widest extent and of the subtlest 
kinds nearly everywhere” (Richards 1936, 40 ). The concept of ambiguity, hence, 
functions as a tentative category in the current humanities disciplines in cases 
where the epistemological interest in semiotic and interpretative systems is char-
acterized by a mistrust of intellectual history’s syntheses as well as dialectical 
reconciliations. The way this term has been used since the twentieth century can 
perhaps, thus, be interpreted as evidence of the (post)modern 
change in thinking […] that finds a way out of the back and forth of antitheses such as unity 
and multiplicity, continuity and discontinuity, subject and structures, lifeworld and system, 
and genesis and validity (Waldenfels 1987, 10 ).
And still, a general theory of ambiguity has yet to be developed. Such a theory 
would need to comprehensively clarify terminology that should include defini-
tions to distinguish it from related phenomena (such as vagueness , polysemy, 
or ambivalence) in historical as well as systematic perspective. It should also 
include a typology of the concept. With regard to the classification of different 
types of ambiguity , we will refer to the American philosopher of language , Israel 
Scheffler , but will apply Scheffler’s theory to the field of cultural anthropology, 
thereby modifying the nomenclature of types accordingly. Scheffler distinguishes 
between elementary ambiguity (e-ambiguity), interpretative ambiguity (i-ambi-
guity), and the phenomenon of multiple meaning (m-ambiguity). These types of 
ambiguity can be distinguished from vagueness and generality, as ambiguity is 
always based on concrete, competing meanings (Scheffler 1979, Fries 1980 ).
Relying on the perspective of cultural anthropology as a backdrop for the 
analysis of these phenomena, we will use the terms elementary, hermeneutic, 
and constitutive ambiguity in our systematization. According to Scheffler , ele-
mentary ambiguity occurs when a concrete sign has different meanings relative 
to the context of its use. This is the case for deictic expressions such as now, here, 
there, or, in the pictorial medium, for indices such as signposts, or arrows.
Not only has the second case, hermeneutical ambiguity , the same condi-
tions as elementary ambiguity, but a concretely used sign must also have at least 
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two competing meanings , both of which must independently be meaningful 
and adequate, but mutually exclusive. In this case, the alternative meanings are 
connected to the concretely used sign itself; they are, in a way, different lexical 
entries for the same sign. Ambiguity, thus, occurs when a context is insufficiently 
specified and does not (yet) allow one of the meanings to be chosen.
Both elementary and hermeneutic ambiguity have a partial character. The 
research of these two types usually focuses on the possibilities of disambigua-
tion . Yet, the defining element for constitutive ambiguity is that the competing 
interpretations of each utterance always exist simultaneously. This type of ambi-
guity must be understood as part of a speech act, meaning that disambiguation 
would truncate or distort communication . According to Scheffler , our example of 
‘Hermann the hermaphrodite’ is characteristic for the ambiguity that he refers to 
as multiple meaning (m-ambiguity) (Scheffler 1989). Both aspects of the appear-
ance are contained simultaneously and discordantly in the sign being used. The 
person’s attire (clothing, hair) does not depict a single, specific object; it exem-
plifies two aspects that are typical of different objects. The central issue we will 
focus on here will, therefore, be to explore the significance of this simultaneity of 
competing meanings.
3   Linguistic Interface
There are numerous linguistic terms that correlate to the distinctions discussed 
above. One term is, for instance, phonetic ambiguity (homophones, i.e. different 
words which are pronounced the same, such as I and eye), which is the equiv-
alent of i-ambiguity in spoken language . We also find lexical ambiguity (hom-
onyms, e.g. tackle in “Nice tackle!” (praising an act of tackling in sports, or, for 
example, fishing gear), which is the equivalent of i-ambiguity in spoken as well 
as written language. Morphological ambiguity (for example, a German history 
teacher (teacher of German history) vs. a German history teacher (German teacher 
of history)) is another linguistic term. Like orthographic ambiguity (homographs, 
e.g. desert (arid region) and desert (abandon)), morphological ambiguity is equiv-
alent to i-ambiguity, but only in written language. All these cases are examples of 
i-ambiguity, as both meanings are competing, but only one of them is intended. 
Ambiguity, hence, only exists more or less theoretically and only as long as the 
meaning of the utterance has not yet become specific. When sufficient contextual 
information is provided, one of the two possibilities can then be chosen. When 
using the word tackle in the example above, we assume that either the act of 
tackling in a sport such as American football or rugby, or the equipment or gear 
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used, for example, when fishing, is being referred to exclusively, and that this is 
not obvious to us because we only have limited access to the respective context .
These examples provide ample grounds to assume that many phenomena of 
ambiguity are interpretative ambig uities with media-specific forms. Elementary 
ambiguities, on the other hand, are regarded as false ambiguities because they 
generally are resolved quickly in their specific use, making it more or less part of 
their meaning to be context -sensitive. Therefore, we will not be taking elementary 
ambiguities into account in the following. It is interesting to note that, up to a 
certain degree, the tendency to dissolve double meaning also applies to inter-
pretative ambiguities that are disambiguated in particular utterance situations 
through the specific utterance contexts, generally making them remain unno-
ticed within communication .
Let us now turn to other linguistic terms. In the case of the much emphasized 
structural or syntactic ambiguity (e.g., “He sees the man with the telescope.”), a 
sentence can clearly be said to have two competing meanings . This is also the case 
for ambiguity on the level of compositional semantics (e.g., “The two employees 
must be able to speak four languages.”). But is this the equivalent of m-ambi-
guity? Are there simultaneous, competing meanings here? Insofar as sentences 
such as these are actually uttered or intended ambiguously (e.g., “Flying planes 
can be dangerous.”), the structurally and compositionally induced ambig uities 
rather seem to be connected to the phenomenon of multiple meaning . However, 
ambiguities such as these are generally also the unintended result of an insuffi-
cient syntactic and semantic determination of the language structure , which can 
be resolved accordingly by adding further contextual information. As a result, 
we believe that these are rather i-ambiguities. Presumably, they are closer to our 
example of ‘Hermann the hermaphrodite’, which is a clear case of m-ambiguity, 
because they are mereological ambiguities, in other words ambiguities that occur 
due to the different interpretations of the relationships between the part and the 
whole, which are typical and fundamental for the pictorial medium. 
In the context of linguistic terms, clearly definable constitutive ambig uities 
exist only on the level of pragmatics. The sentence, The air is stuffy, is an example 
of m-ambiguity because – from the point of view of speech act theory  – the illocu-
tionary and/or perlocutionary function can both be interpreted differently while 
both are simultaneously intended. As to its illocutionary role, the sentence can 
be interpreted as information and as an appeal (e.g. to open the window). While 
both meanings do not necessarily exclude one another, they certainly exist simul-
taneously as independent meanings. Such constitutive ambiguities caused by 
pragmatics can be interpreted differently based on different models of commu-
nication . If, for instance, we use Schulz von Thun’s model in our analysis, then 
we can distinguish between the aspects of content (information), relation, appeal 
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(request), and self-revelation. According to Schulz von Thun (1981–1998) , these 
aspects are always present simultaneously. Insofar as they entail and convey not 
only different aspects of communication but also sometimes competing mes-
sages, we are dealing with constitutive ambiguity .
Finally, we would like to refer to the term ambivalence in our discussion of 
the different types of ambiguity . Those complex phenomena of ambiguity that 
receive special public attention usually involve different assessments, in other 
words, ambivalence. To distinguish this from ambiguity, we will reserve the terms 
ambivalence or polyvalence respectively when referring to the phenomenon of 
competing assessments. A rose may seem ambivalent insofar as the flower is 
rated positive while the thorns are seen as negative. Ambivalence is, therefore, 
a subjective quality. It derives from the individual set of values that define the 
relationship between a person and an object. The ambiguity of ‘Herman the 
hermaphrodite’ is ambivalent insofar as the two characters in the novel agree 
that gender identity must be unambiguous and cannot be ambiguous . Thus, the 
“wrong” use of the proper name and the “right” use of anthropological classifi-
cation both work to ease the gender trouble. We regard ambiguity as the central 
category here because ambivalences (arising from competing values) are caused 
by ambig uities (arising from competing interpretations). Indeed, we regard the 
phenomenon of ambiguity as fundamental, because the ambivalent assessment 
in communicative contexts is based on competing attributions of meaning .
Summing up, it should be noted that 1) the type of constitutive ambiguity 
(or multiple meanings ) is primarily realized on the pragmatic level in a socially 
interesting way, but on this level it no longer seems to have the clarity of the lexi-
cally based ambiguity . In order to 2) better determine constitutive ambiguity, we 
should assume that we are generally dealing with ambiguity that is intended 
and intentionally used in a performative way, in other words, a form of strategic 
behavior .
4   Media Forms of Ambiguity
Communication is necessarily conveyed through media. Accordingly, ambiguity 
can only be researched in its media-specific forms. Speech (spoken language ), 
text (written language), and image – and especially their respective multi-media 
connections to hybrid forms – are paradigmatic media forms of communication 
that are characterized through ambiguity in different ways. The discussion of 
the different types of ambiguity corresponding to existing linguistic terms has 
already shown that we can assume different media realizations for each type. The 
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Latin expression incultoloco contains – when printed in the Latin scriptura conti-
nua – a written i-ambiguity (in culto loco vs. inculto loco). The English expression 
“there” is unambiguous in written form, but contains a phonetic i-ambiguity in 
a spoken utterance (it could be confused with “their”). In addition to the media-
specific forms of spoken or written language, we also want to point out the media-
specific forms of the image (Scheffler 1989 ). How do the different types of ambigu-
ity correlate with their media forms? Is communication defined by different forms 
of ambiguity ? And what is the specific quality of pragmatic ambiguity?
As already discussed above, we assume that a fundamental condition of com-
munication is that communication processes are always connected to specific 
means of communication, in other words, media (Posner 1986). While language , 
rooted in reason (logos), has been traditionally regarded as the essential anthro-
pological basis of conveyance, we are critical of regarding it as a universally 
established apparatus for exploring and structuring the world (Vogel 2001 ). In 
our opinion, the role of cultural conveyance can be attributed to different media 
(Sachs-Hombach 2013 , Schirra & Sachs-Hombach 2006 ). Ambiguity, therefore, 
necessarily has media-specific forms. The investigation of these forms is espe-
cially important, as each medium is characterized by very different ability pro-
files, and because ambiguity takes on different forms depending on the medium 
being used, making a comparative analysis of media forms necessary. If, like 
Wittgenstein, we treat ambiguity as a phenomenon of aspect perception, we can 
also investigate to what extent the different aspects of understanding utterances 
with a double or multiple meaning are the result of interpretative requirements 
or perceptual mechanisms, and to what extent not only cultural influences, but 
also intercultural, anthropological constants are hereby relevant for the choice 
of each aspect. 
5   Semantic Levels of Ambiguity
It is not sufficient to distinguish between different types and media forms of 
ambiguity when trying to achieve a complete understanding of constitutive ambi-
guity . Ambiguity also has different effects in different dimensions of the commu-
nication process. First, it can be found on the level of content (content, applied 
to language , being understood as lexical meaning ). The example of ‘Hermann 
the hermaphrodite,’ for instance, allows us to ascribe two types of competing 
content, namely male aspects and female aspects. This is why wit in general 
(Grimmelshausen’s in particular) is a good example of constitutive ambiguity on 
the lexical or content level.
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In addition to content, the referential level is also important. It does make a 
difference whether signs display ambiguity in their content-related meaning or in 
their reference. Expressions with a nominal function, for instance proper names, 
can be unambiguous in terms of content, but ambiguous in terms of reference. 
For instance, a photograph of a person who has a twin sibling can be ambiguous 
as to which one of the twins it is referring, even though the content of the photo-
graph, in other words a particular person’s appearance, can be clearly described.
Concerning the general complexity of ambiguity in communicative processes , 
we have to take into account not only the content and reference – and this is our 
main argument here – but also the pragmatic level, in other words, the level of 
the meaning of the utterance (Wunderlich 1976 ). Following intentionalist seman-
tics , we deduct the meaning of the utterance by looking at a specific utterance 
in light of the speaker ’s intention . The meaning of an utterance is, thus, based 
on ascribing or interpreting the communicative intentions (Grice 1957 , Meggle 
1990 , see also the relevance theory according to Sperber & Wilson 1986 ). By also 
putting ambiguity on the level of determining intentions, we take the decisive 
step of broadening the concept of ambiguity to include the field of constitutive 
ambiguity in all its performative complexity.
From the point of view of communication theory , we would like to conclude 
that constitutive ambiguity appears to function as a performative phenomenon 
on the level of utterance meaning in a way that is relevant for society while it also 
presupposes competing determinations of communicative intentions or commu-
nicative purposes.
6   Conclusion
According to our argument, a general theory of ambiguity should be rooted in 
cultural anthropology, or rather, to be precise, the anthropology of media. Essen-
tially, the assumed connection between ambiguity, media, and culture is anthro-
pologically motivated. As all humans are exposed to other cultures (Plessner 
1928 ), culture functions as a specific (second) nature that humans, as animalia 
symbolica (Cassirer 1944 ), rely on in order to continuously adapt their social 
behavior to a changing environment (Tomasello 2009 ). That is why culture pro-
vides the necessary background, making prototypical images, scenes, and nar-
ratives available to each individual member of a society for better action control. 
The constitutive aspectual character and restriction of relevance as to what is 
conveyed through the media acquires its theoretical meaning through its convey-
ance, which must be continually updated throughout history (Seel 1998 , 253). 
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That is why an anthropology of media can be divided into the two perspectives 
of analyzing media according to communicative, or evolutionary points of view.
An anthropology of media based on communication theory understands 
ambiguity as a specific phenomenon of communicative action. Accordingly, the 
communicative requirements that ensure a structural framework for a general 
theory of ambiguity can be laid out in detail. These requirements include, for 
instance, the basic assumptions of speech act theory, relevance theory, as well as 
broader conceptions of communicative action, as developed by Habermas (1981) . 
Ambiguity can also be understood as an evolutionary strategy of enculturation. 
In this case, media anthropology also serves as an anthropological theory. If this 
presupposes the use of media in the formation of modern human beings and in 
the further development of cultural standards, then it also implies that all cul-
tures must develop their own ways of dealing with ambiguity as a sophisticated 
form of open communication. We can assume that cultures that are more tolerant 
towards ambiguity will have greater variability in the hermeneutical processing 
of ambiguity and, thus, develop an evolutionary advantage that can help them to 
better tackle cultural challenges. We believe that one argument in favor of this is 
that communication is more than, occasionally different from, and never only the 
conveyance of, information. It primarily serves social functions. Both the social 
cohesion within a group as well as the strategic positioning of the individual 
within a group is conveyed through communication.
The connection between the communicative and evolutionary aspects of 
an anthropology of media is revealed when ambiguity is intentionally used as a 
strategic tool. Ambiguity can be used intentionally, for example, when produc-
ing specific communicative utterances in order to conceal the intended reading 
behind another official reading avoiding undesirable consequences. Ambigu-
ity can also be used by the recipient in order to create freedom of interpretation 
and to avoid an assumed dominant reading. In the context of an anthropology 
of media, a proposed general theory of ambiguity should take into account the 
different strategic functions of ambiguity and analyze them according to their 
respective rationality. From the evolutionary point of view, it has in no way been 
settled that unambiguity in communication is always an advantage. If unambigu-
ity can only be achieved with great effort, then it would seem to be actually an 
evolutionary advantage to abstain from unambiguity for the benefit of the effi-
cient use of the means of communication. The Oracle of Delphi could, therefore, 
be regarded as an instrument of enculturation that served an important function 
for the political development of ancient Greece by skilfully dealing with ambigu-
ity (in other words, practicing tolerance for ambiguity).
Putting emphasis on the strategic use of ambiguity most certainly directs 
our attention to the cultural role fulfilled by conflicts of meaning and, thus, 
Bereitgestellt von | UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zürich
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 03.10.16 14:11
 Dimensions of Constitutive Ambiguity       281
emphasizes the connection between power, identity, and cultural development. 
With respect to cultural studies, the point of view of the intentionalist theory of 
meaning, which interprets functioning communication as the convergence of 
what was meant by the “addresser” and what was understood by the “addressee,” 
should, however, be reversed. The communicative and cultural anthropological 
function of ambiguity is, in many cases, actually based on the (open or hidden) 
incongruity between these two entities. It can be seen as either implicit or explicit. 
The use of implicit ambiguity makes it possible to either disguise or resist power. 
In contrast, the use of explicit ambiguity is a political tool that either reinforces 
or obstructs hegemonic meanings.
In consequence, the research of ambiguity employs very different systems 
of categories to describe phenomena of ambiguity. The phenomenon of compet-
ing meanings in an insufficient context (i-ambiguity, or hermeneutic ambiguity) 
can be seen as the standard form of ambiguity. This type of ambiguity is most 
likely the result of an effective use of the means of communication , as it is appar-
ently very economical not to refer to contexts explicitly but to implicitly take them 
for granted, or to only make them explicit if this is relevant to the aims of com-
munication. This type of ambiguity is rather unproblematic and can actually be 
resolved with little effort. It has been our aim here to point out another type of 
ambiguity which we have labelled constitutive ambiguity and which we have dis-
cussed primarily as a pragmatic phenomenon. Unlike interpretative ambiguity, 
constitutive ambiguity has simultaneously competing interpretations. According 
to our argument, this simultaneity is applied, in the use of constitutive ambiguity, 
as a communication strategy , in order to prevent an unambiguous communica-
tion situation. Each (communicative) action, indeed, becomes more flexible  – 
something that we believe can be regarded as an advantage from an evolutionary 
perspective.
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